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Motivation - Problem
z OnTheMap provides conditional residence distributions across 
approximately 8 million blocks - most counts are too low to be 
released based on any typical cell suppression rules
z Traditional disclosure avoidance methods are not applicable to 
data that are sparsely distributed across sensitive attributes
z Synthetic data is a promising confidentiality protection 
approach
z Need to quantify degree of confidentiality protection, i.e. how 
much information leaks from the anonymization algorithms?
This presentation
z Version 3 of OnTheMap is based on a 
synthetic data anonymization algorithm that 
offers formal privacy guarantees in terms of 
ε-differential privacy
z Data developed by staff at the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household 
Dynamics Program (LEHD) 
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2. Overview of OnTheMap
OnTheMap – Overview
z OnTheMap is an interactive mapping application that shows in high 
geographic resolution where people reside and work along with 
characteristics of home and work areas Æ Valuable tool for 
transportation planning, emergency planning, and economic 
development purposes
z Version 3
–
 
Released in 2008
–
 
More data: all 48 states in production, additional years of data
 
(2002-06)
–
 
Additional features in online application
–
 
Segmented data: O/D by age, earnings and industry
–
 
Refined disclosure avoidance methodology with formal privacy guarantee
http://lehdmap3.did.census.gov/themap3
Where residents of Sausolito, CA, with 
high wages are employed
OnTheMap – Features 
z Analysis capabilities include:
–
 
Selection of work or home area by geographical layers or by 
freehand 
–
 
Selection of year (2002-2006), of 4 job types (primary jobs 
vs. all jobs in the private vs. all sectors) and segmentation 
possibilities by earnings, age or industry groups
z Commute and Labor Shed Maps/Reports
z Area Characteristics Reports
z Block-level QWIs
OnTheMap – Public Use Micro Data
z The micro data that feed the application are available for 
download (unrestricted access)*
z An observation is a unique Origin Block-Characteristic**-
Destination Block combination with information on the job 
counts
z Origin counts need protection (destination counts are public-
use information***)
* See http://lehd.dsd.gov
 
for more information about application and access
** A characteristic is defined by a combination of 3 industry groups, 3 earnings 
and 3 age categories 
*** Destination counts that are subject to item suppression and replaced by 
synthetic values
3. The Synthetic Data Anonymization 
Algorithm
Modeling Objective
z To maximize analytical validity in terms of: 
1.
 
Completeness of estimates
2.
 
Preservation of key properties of micro data
z Subject to confidentiality restrictions in 
terms of:
1.
 
Conditional (and unconditional) origin block 
counts that need protection
2.
 
Public-Use data on destination counts and 
characteristics
Synthetic Data Model
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z Likelihood of place of residence (index i) conditional 
on place of work (index j) and characteristics (index 
k):
z The resulting posteriors of θ is Dirichlet with parameter 
y + α
z Synthetic place of residence counts by sampling from 
the posterior predictive distributions conditional on 
already disclosure protected destination population 
counts, Yjk
4. Formal Privacy Guarantees
Epsilon-Differential Privacy
z The anonymization algorithm is said to provide ε-
differential privacy if the amount of additional 
information the attacker can gain concerning an 
unknown data point is bounded by ε
z ε is the log odds favoring any data set over another 
generated from the anonymization algorithm that 
differ in exactly one row 
z Note privacy audit is based on posterior transition 
matrix, not actual randomized data
Differential Privacy - Example
z Population: 10 workers distributed across 3 
residence locations
z Consider an attacker that has complete 
information about: 
–
 
all the data except one observation
–
 
all aspects of the anonymization
 
algorithm, except 
for the seeds used in the randomization process
Privacy Audit
A B C All
Attacker’s information 9 ? ? 10
Data 1 (true) 9 1 0 10
Data 2 (not true) 9 0 1 10
Prior (known to attacker) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
P[y|Data
 
1] 0.883 0.107 0.010 1.000
P[y|Data
 
2] 0.883 0.010 0.107 1.000
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Example of Infinite Differential Privacy
A B C All
Attacker’s Information 9 ? ? 10
Data 1 9 1 0 10
Data 2 9 0 1 10
Prior 0.1 0.1 0 0.2
P[y|Data
 
1= true] 0.892 0.108 0.000 1.000
P[y|Data
 
2= true] 0.892 0.010 0.008 1.000
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Search algorithm
z Search algorithm to find minimum prior support to 
guarantee ε-differential privacy developed in 
Machavajjhala et al. (2008)
z We rely on the concept of (δ,ε)-differential privacy, 
where the search algorithm guarantees ε-differential 
privacy with 1- δ confidence
z The anonymization algorithm implemented in 
OnTheMap guarantees ε -differential privacy 
protection of 8.99 with 99.999999% confidence (δ = 
0.000001)
5. Implementation
Main Complication
z Outcome domain has support across 
approximately 8 million blocks 
z To avoid infinite differential privacy each 
point in the domain has to have minimum 
prior support
ÎFor any model with acceptable formal privacy 
guarantees this will adversely impact the 
analytical validity of data
Measures to improve analytical validity
1.
 
Coarsening of the outcome domain
–
 
Reducing the number of support points in the domain
2.
 
Restricting the outcome space
–
 
Eliminating the most unlikely commute patterns (from prior and
 
likelihood)
3.
 
Use of informative priors 
–
 
Impose likely shape based on published data (s.t. minimum prior 
support that will ensure epsilon differential privacy)
4.
 
Pruning the prior
–
 
Randomly eliminating a fraction support points with no likelihood 
support. 
–
 
Pruning comes with a penalty in terms of privacy protection
Coarsening of the outcome space
1.
 
If origin block very far away from destination block (distance >
 
90th
 
pctl
 
of CTTP commute distribution) coarsened to Super-PUMA
2.
 
Else if origin block far away from destination block (distance >
 
50th
 
pctl
 
of CTTP commute distribution) coarsened to PUMA
3.
 
Else if origin block close to destination block (distance < 50th
 
pctile
 
of 
CTTP commute distribution) coarsened to Census Tract
Idea: “marginal differences in commute distances between candidate 
locations have less predictive power in allocating workers the farther 
away the locations are”
Note: The synthesizer samples from the coarsened domain. Conditional 
on draw, block is sampled based on Decennial 2000 population 
estimates
Support points in domain
State A State B State C
Support points: Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Total 1,005 583 2,067 1,027 619 1,560 672 602 818
By level of coarsening
- Super-PUMA 526 519 538 526 518 539 537 535 539
- PUMA 39 9 73 47 7 79 10 4 19
- Census Tract 438 32 1,506 453 72 998 125 56 272
By distance  (in miles) between centroids
- low-10 265 1 878 188 1 438 15 1 49
- 10-25 127 8 794 195 13 612 16 1 60
- 25-100 85 23 289 121 45 296 54 15 169
- 100-500 139 119 206 181 151 238 80 29 233
- 500-high 389 361 412 343 300 373 508 486 519
Fraction of points in the domain with 
support in CTPP data 
State A State B State C
Distance (in miles) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
- low-10 0.47 0.37 0.40 0.32 0.92 0.18
- 10-25 0.30 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.63 0.29
- 25-100 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.16
- 100-500 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
- 500-high 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
All 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.23 0.34 0.40
Restricting the outcome space
z For each work tract: 
–
 
if point in domain has zero support in prior data then do:
z eliminate point with p=0.98 if distance>500 miles
z eliminate point with p=0.9 if distance>200 miles
z eliminate point with p=0.5 if distance>100 miles
z do not eliminate if distance<100 miles
–
 
else do not eliminate
z Note: contribution of any likelihood data in eliminated 
points also eliminated
5. Fraction of points in the domain with 
support in CTPP data after eliminating 
extremely unlikely commute patterns
State A State B State C
distance (in miles) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
- low-10 0.47 0.37 0.40 0.32 0.92 0.18
- 10-25 0.30 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.63 0.29
- 25-100 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.16
- 100-500 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.14
- 500-high 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.08
All 0.21 0.27 0.15 0.23 0.36 0.39
Fraction of Likelihood data eliminated by eliminating unlikely commute 
patterns is about 3-7% depending on state and year
Informative priors
z In year 2002: Public use CTTP data
z In year 2003-2006: Public use year-1 
OnTheMap data
z alfa = max[min_alfa, f(prior density)]  
z Priors unique to each employment tract
Pruning the prior
z Unpruned prior is defined by alfa = max[alfa_min, 
f(prior density)]
z Pruned prior defined by alfa*
–
 
For points with likelihood support alfa* = alfa
–
 
For points with no likelihood support alfa* = 0 with probability 
1-p and alfa* = alfa
 
with probability p, where 
p=max[alfa,min_p]
z Benchmark min_p = 0.025
z Pruning comes with a cost in terms of privacy 
protection Î ε=g(ε*,min_p), where ε* is the “Nominal 
epsilon”
6. Tradeoffs between Analytical 
Validity and Privacy Protection
Benchmark case
z Choice parameters in the model:
–
 
Parameters in domain coarsening algorithm
–
 
Parameters in domain restriction algorithm
–
 
Nominal epsilon, delta and the pruning function
z [ε *,δ, min_p] = [4.6,0.000001,0.025] Î ε < 9 in all 
cases with 99.99999% confidence
z We evaluate effects by changing one parameter at 
the time around benchmark case
Analytic validity metric
z As metrics for divergence between posterior and likelihood for a
population we calculate the Kullback-Leibler Divergence index 
(KL) and the Integrated Mean Square Error (IMSE) over a 29 
point grid defined by the cross product of:
–
 
8 commute distance categories (in miles: 0, (0-1), [1-4), [4-10), 
[10-25), [25-100), [100,500), [500+]
–
 
5 commute direction categories (NW, NE, SW, SE, “N/A”)
z DKL= 0 if identical; DKL=∞ if no overlap
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DKL by nominal value of ε*
Kullback‐Leibler Divergence by Epsilon: All Populations
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Varying ε* - Summary
z Figures show the population-weighted DKL for all and 
small (<10) populations for ε* = 2, 4, 4.6, 10 and 25
z DKL close to zero for values of ε* > 4
z Significant gains in analytical validity for small 
populations as we increase ε* further to 4.6
z The marginal improvements in analytical validity 
from even higher values of ε* hard to justify in terms 
the costs in privacy protection loss
Varying δ
 
- Summary
z We evaluate δ = 0.001, 0.0001, 0.00001 and 
0.000001
z Only very marginal improvements in 
analytical validity as we decrease confidence 
from 1 in a million to 1 in a 100. 
z No reason to consider values of δ > 
0.000001
DKL and ε
 
vs. paramater, min_p, in 
pruning function
Kullback‐Leibler Divergence and Prune‐adjusted Epsilon by Minimum Retention Probability in Prune Function: All 
Populations
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Varying min_p - Summary 
z Figures show the population-weighted DKL for all and 
small (<10) populations and ε for min_p = 0.1, 0.05, 
0.025 and 0.001
z Large gains in analytical validity as min_p is 
decreased from 0.1 to 0.05 for all populations and 
further large gains for small populations as min_p is 
decreased to 0.025. 
z The marginal improvements in analytical validity 
from even lower values of min_p hard to justify in 
terms the costs in privacy protection loss
Posterior, likelihood and prior mass across 
commute ranges for all and for small 
populations
State A
All Small (min-10)
Distance Post. Lik. Prior Post. Lik. Prior
0 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.30 0.32 0.18
(0-1) 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.03
[1-4) 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.27 0.17
[4-10) 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.31
[10-25) 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.21 0.22 0.17
[25-100) 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.31
[100-500) 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.11
[500-high] 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.08
7. Summary
z Synthetic data as an anyonymization algorithm promising 
alternative to traditional disclosure avoidance methods, 
especially when data representation is sparse  
z Hard to quantify degree of disclosure protection – synthetic 
data methods may leak more information than intended
z OnTheMap version 3 demonstrates the successful 
implementation of formal privacy guarantees based on the 
concept of ε-differential privacy
z To achieve acceptable analytical validity results s.t. privacy 
guarantees requires experimentation
